Civil Procedure: You\u27ve Been Served . . . Or Have You?—Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings by Cochran, Gus
Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 1 Article 8
2018
Civil Procedure: You've Been Served . . . Or Have
You?—Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings
Gus Cochran
Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mitchell Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Cochran, Gus (2018) "Civil Procedure: You've Been Served . . . Or Have You?—Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings," Mitchell Hamline Law
Review: Vol. 44 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss1/8
274 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: YOU’VE BEEN SERVED . . . OR 
HAVE YOU?—JAEGER V. PALLADIUM HOLDINGS
By Gus Cochran†
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 275
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW .................................................. 277
A. Separation of Powers: Rulemaking Authority at the Federal & 
State Levels ................................................................. 277
1. Federal Rulemaking ................................................. 277
2. Minnesota Rulemaking ............................................ 278
B.  Service Rules: Comporting with Due Process ...................... 280
C.  Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure ................................. 283
D.  Substitute Service ......................................................... 285
1. Usual Place of Abode ............................................... 285
2. Suitable Age and Discretion ..................................... 287
3. “Then Residing Therein” .......................................... 288
E.  The Actual Notice Exception ........................................... 290
III. JAEGER DECISION .................................................................... 291
A.  Facts & Procedural History............................................ 291
B.  Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision ............................... 294
IV. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 297
A.  Jaeger’s Limitation of Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
4.03(a) Comports with Plain Meaning ............................ 297
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court has the Authority to Amend
Rules of Procedure, and Should Therefore Restrict Service
Rules to Their Plain Meaning ................................... 298
2. Federal Jurisprudence Governing Substitute Service Supports
a Plain Meaning Interpretation of Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure 4.03(a) ................................................... 300
3. Bottom Line: Residency ............................................ 303
†  JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2019; BA Criminal Justice, 
Loras College, 2016. I would like to thank Professor James Coben for his 
insightful instruction, as well as the Mitchell Hamline Law Review staff for their 
thoughtful feedback and diligence throughout the editing process. I dedicate 
this note to my late father, Philip A. Cochran, whose zeal for life, learning, and 
service continues to inspire my every endeavor. 
1
Cochran: Civil Procedure: You've Been Served . . . Or Have You?—Jaeger v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
2018] THE RESIDE REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTITUTE SERVICE 275 
B.  Jaeger Properly Rejected the Actual Notice Exception to 
Substitute Service .......................................................... 304
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court Adhered to Stare Decisis in
Rejecting an Actual Notice Exception .......................... 304
2. Rejecting the Actual Notice Exception Under the Current
Rule Promotes the Most Practical Service Standard ....... 310
C. Substantial Dominion: A Reasonable Alternative to an Actual 
Notice Exception ........................................................... 315
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 319
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Jaeger v. Palladium,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a 
plain meaning construction of the “then residing therein”2 
requirement for substitute service at an individual’s usual place of 
abode,3 rejecting the nexus test originally advanced by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals in O’Sell v. Peterson.4 Under this strict 
application, a person accepting service on behalf of another must 
have “lived in the named recipient’s place of abode permanently or 
for an extended period at the time when the process server 
attempt[ed] service.”5 Additionally, the court struck down the 
“actual notice exception” to strict compliance with Minnesota Rules 
of Civil Procedure 4.03(a), holding that substantial compliance with 
the rule was not sufficient to effectuate service.6 Accordingly, the 
court held that a substitute service recipient must be an individual 
“residing” in the home, even when the intended recipient received 
prompt actual notice of an action.7 Utilizing this approach, the court 
concluded in Jaeger that substitute service on a defendant’s adult 
son—who had never lived at the defendant’s place of abode—was 
ineffective.8  
1. 884 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2016).
2. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a).
3. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 605–06.
4. Id. at 606; see also O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (“[T]here must be a nexus between the individual and the defendant that 
establishes some reasonable assurance that notice would reach the defendant.”). 
5. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 605.
6. See id. at 610–11.
7. See id. It was unclear whether the court intended for Jaeger’s residency
requirement to apply to all service rules. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
8. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 608.
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This Note begins with a description of rulemaking authority at 
the federal and state levels.9 Next, the discussion pivots to an analysis 
of Due Process and the states’ authority to prescribe their own rules 
of procedure.10 This Note then introduces service rules under the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,11 followed by an overview of 
substitute service12 and the actual notice exception.13 The Jaeger facts, 
procedural history, and decision follow.14 Next, the Note analyzes 
the Jaeger decision, which limited Rule 4 to its plain meaning15 and 
rejected the lower courts’ use of the actual notice exception.16 
Finally, the Note concludes by proposing an amendment to 
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a) to better meet the Rules’ 
primary goal of securing the “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”17 
While supportive of the holding in Jaeger, the author is not 
insensitive to cases in which employing exceptions to the rules may 
secure a more equitable result. Well-intentioned courts have 
explicably invoked the actual notice exception while proclaiming a 
preference for resolving disputes on their merits, as opposed to a 
mere formality. With that same goal in mind, this Note proposes the 
addition of a “substantial dominion” provision to Rule 4.03(a) to 
generate just results without sacrificing a fair and consistent reading 
of the rules.18 
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part II.D.
13. See infra Part II.E.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part IV.B.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
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II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
A. Separation of Powers: Rulemaking Authority at the Federal & State 
Levels 
1. Federal Rulemaking
Though the United States Constitution is silent on the issue,19 
Congress has traditionally retained the power to prescribe and 
regulate rules of federal procedure.20 The United States Supreme 
Court has declared this authority to derive from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause,21 coupled with Congress’s power to establish the 
lower federal courts.22 Dating back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
Congress has delegated judicial rulemaking authority to the 
Supreme Court.23 This remains true today under the ambit of the 
Rules Enabling Act.24 Judicial Conference committees propose and 
approve new rules and amendments,25 then transmit the final 
changes to the Supreme Court.26 If the Supreme Court returns the 
amended rules to Congress, the rules take effect on December 1 of 
19. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & ADAM STEINMAN, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 (4th ed. 2017); see U.S. CONST. 
20. WRIGHT, MILLER, & STEINMAN, supra note 19.
21. See WRIGHT, MILLER, & STEINMAN, supra note 19. (“With regard to the
national courts, the weight of authority in this country supports the right of 
Congress to prescribe rules of judicial procedure for the federal courts.” (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States”))).  
22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 
(1992).  
23. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (“[C]ourts of the
United States shall have . . . power to make and establish all necessary rules for the 
orderly conducting of business in the said courts, provided such rules are not 
repugnant to the laws of the United States.”).  
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1990). As amended, the Act provided that “[t]he
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and 
courts of appeals.” Id.  
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (1994).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988).
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the same year, unless Congress exercises its veto power.27 In addition 
to vetoing proposed rule amendments, Congress may create 
exceptions to a rule, either by direct amendment or by passing laws 
to override the rule.28 For the most part, however, Congress defers 
judicial rulemaking decisions, often referring proposed changes to 
the Court or an Advisory Committee.29 
2. Minnesota Rulemaking
The Minnesota legislature has shown its judicial branch a 
similar amount of deference in relinquishing judicial rulemaking 
authority. Minnesota’s first constitution provided that “[l]egal 
pleadings and proceedings in the Courts . . . shall be under the 
direction of the Legislature.”30 In 1947, largely in response to the 
congressionally enacted Rules Enabling Act,31 the Minnesota 
legislature passed its own enabling act, allowing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure.32 Shortly 
thereafter, the court formed its first advisory rule-drafting 
committee.33 Notably, Minnesota’s enabling act reserved the 
legislature’s ability to “enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify 
or repeal any rule of the supreme court adopted pursuant thereto.”34 
The first Rules of Procedure were adopted by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in 1951, and took effect on January 1, 1952.35 In 
27. Id.
28. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400
(2010) (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; it can create exceptions to an individual rule as it sees fit—either by 
directly amending the rule or by enacting a separate statute overriding it in certain 
instances.”). 
29. WRIGHT, MILLER, & STEINMAN, supra note 19. But see Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 5, 96 Stat. 2527, 2530 
(1983) (amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to service). 
30. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1857) (repealed 1957).
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Maynard E. Pirsig &
Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 141, 153 (1989) (“When state courts have undertaken to adopt 
rules of procedure they have followed the example set on the federal level [by the 
Enabling Act]. For instance, the Minnesota Legislature passed a similar act in 
1947.”) 
32. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, §§ 1–8 (approved April 23, 1947); Pirsig &
Tietjen, supra note 31 at 163. 
33. Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note 31, at 164.
34. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, § 8.
35. 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, Preface (6th
5
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1957, the Minnesota constitutional provision vesting the legislature 
with control over “[l]egal pleadings and proceedings” was repealed, 
leaving the constitution silent on the matter. Because this repeal 
could evidence an intent to transfer rulemaking power to the 
judiciary,36 considerable debate has arisen regarding rulemaking 
authority and the separation of powers in Minnesota.37  
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court maintains the power 
to formulate judicial rules as prescribed by legislative enactment,38 
the court has continually suggested that judicial rulemaking 
authority is inherent in the Minnesota Constitution.39 The court has 
gone so far as to state that “[a]lthough legislative enactments have 
addressed procedural issues, we have permitted legislative 
interference with procedural matters only as a matter of comity.”40 
However, the court has also declared its duty to “exercise great 
restraint” in analyzing procedural statutes, “particularly when the 
consideration involves what is a legislative function and what is a 
ed. 2017). 
36. But see Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note 31, at 165–66. Notably, the Judiciary
Committee had included a rulemaking provision in their drafted revisions of the 
judiciary article, but it was “mysteriously omitted” from the final report. Id. at 166. 
The Committee’s final report then recommended rules be made “as provided by 
law.” REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA 9 (1948). But cf. 
Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note 31, at 166 (noting that the proposed amendment failed 
to garner support from the legislature and was never submitted to voters). 
37. See Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note 31, at 143 (“[I]t is not settled in Minnesota
whether court procedural rulemaking is a power of the judicial or legislative branch, 
or some combination of the two.”); State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 
1994) (explaining that after the 1956 amendment to the Judiciary Article of the 
Minnesota Constitution, the legislature no longer has authority to regulate court 
procedure). 
38. MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017) (“The Supreme Court of this state shall have
the power to regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in 
civil actions in all courts of this state, including the probate court, by rules 
promulgated by it from time to time.”). 
39. See Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 566 (Minn. 2012) (“Minnesota’s
Constitution grants [the court] inherent authority over the procedures within 
Minnesota’s courts.” (citing State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 2006))); 
Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 554 (“Determination of procedural matters is a judicial 
function.”); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn. 1983) (“[T]he judicial 
function constitutionally empowers the courts to make their own rules of procedure 
. . . and this prerogative of the courts to formulate and alter rules of evidence ought 
not to be doubted.”). 
40. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 657 (Minn. 2007) (emphasis added).
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judicial function.”41 The debate is further muddied by the court’s 
willingness to acquiesce to legislative action on rulemaking. For 
example, in 1987, the legislature passed a bill that altered the order 
of final arguments in criminal trials.42 Rather than resisting the 
statutory amendment, the supreme court modified its rule to 
comport with the adopted legislation.43  
Ultimately, the issue regarding which branch of government 
possesses constitutional authority to promulgate rules of procedure 
in Minnesota is far from settled. This Note will further analyze the 
likely outcome of possible amendments to service rules.44  
B.  Service Rules: Comporting with Due Process 
Before examining service rules in Minnesota, it is useful to 
address the concepts of due process45 and personal jurisdiction,46 
and the role each plays in a state’s authority to formulate rules of 
procedure and methods of service of process. 
Due process of law is afforded by the Fifth47 and Fourteenth48 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Due Process 
Clauses provide the fundamental right to receive adequate notice of 
an action and the opportunity for an appropriate hearing prior to 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.49 Modern due process law 
imposes two requirements for personal jurisdiction: (1) a party must 
41. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 554 (citing Willis, 332 N.W.2d at 184). See also State
v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 148 (Minn. 2005) (providing that the legislature has
the authority to fix levels of punishment for criminal acts, but that the judiciary 
authorizes the imposition of a sentence). 
42. See MINN. STAT. § 631.07 (2017) (granting the prosecution the right to a
surrebuttal during closing arguments). 
43. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03(11) (1988).
44. See infra Part IV.A.2.
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
46. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1069 (4th ed. 2017) (providing a comprehensive overview and 
jurisprudential history of personal jurisdiction). 
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing protections against deprivations by
the federal government). 
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (expressly prohibiting states from
depriving citizens of the right to due process). 
49. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hannover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950). 
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receive adequate notice and be granted an opportunity to be heard, 
and (2) a sufficient relationship must exist between the party and 
the forum state.50 Thus, service of process not only provides advance 
notice to an individual, but also allows courts to assert personal 
jurisdiction over a party.51 Accordingly, when service in a given 
action is held to be deficient, the case must ordinarily be dismissed 
for lack of personal jurisdiction.52 Thus, the adequacy of various 
prescribed methods of service are central to the issue of due process 
as it relates to the rules of civil procedure. 
The United States Supreme Court declared in Mullane v. Central 
Hannover Bank & Trust that for notice of an action to comport with 
due process, it must be given in a manner “reasonably calculated . . .
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.”53 This standard 
serves as a constitutional minimum resting on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The Court has utilized the 
Mullane standard to resolve debates revolving around whether the 
steps taken or methods prescribed were reasonable.55  
50. 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
COMMENTARY, Rule 4 (2017); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of 
Unemployment Comp., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (setting forth the “minimum 
contacts” test for personal jurisdiction). 
51. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104,
108 (1987). 
52. See, e.g., Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)
(“Before a . . . court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 
procedural requirement of service of process must be satisfied [and] [a]bsent 
proper service of process or a waiver thereof, the district court must dismiss the 
action.” (citation omitted)). But see Mercer v. Andersen, 715 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006) (showing an appellate court exercising authority to dismiss the case with 
prejudice based on the tolling of the statute of limitations despite plaintiff’s 
concession that service of process was insufficient). 
53. 339 U.S. 306,  314 (1950).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”); see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 
U.S. 444, 449 (1982).  
55. See Taylor v. Yee, 136 S. Ct. 929, 929–30 (2016) (holding that California
must take reasonably calculated steps to provide notice before escheating property); 
see also Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 478–79 (1988) 
(applying the Mullane test in holding that Oklahoma’s nonclaim statute is not a self-
executing statute of limitations, and that the creditor was required to provide 
notice); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983) (holding 
that neither publication and posting, nor mailed notice to the property owner, as 
required by Indiana law, are reasonable means used to notify mortgagee). 
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Because the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
functions as a constitutional floor,56 states are free to pass laws that 
provide greater protection for their citizens.57 States may prescribe 
rules of procedure governing service of process, so long as they do 
not violate the minimum requirements of due process imposed by 
the Constitution and set forth in Mullane.58 The majority of states, 
including Minnesota, attempt to mirror the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.59 However, plenty of state laws and rules of procedure 
depart from their federal counterparts—including those authorizing 
methods of service.60 These departures are especially significant 
given the allowance of state-prescribed methods of service in the 
Federal Rules.61 Moreover, rather than interpreting a state’s service 
rule or law on their own, federal courts apply the state’s highest 
court’s interpretation of the applicable rule.62 Thus, a state supreme 
court’s administration of service rules carries significant implications 
for jurisprudence in both state and federal courts. 
56. See Greene, 456 U.S. at 454–56 (analyzing service methods against the
“minimum standards of due process”); see id. at 456 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(addressing what the Fourteenth Amendment requires “[a]t a minimum”). 
57. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (applying a higher
standard for searches and seizures under California law than federal law). 
58. See Greene, 456 U.S. at 450–51 (providing that states’ due process
requirements are evaluated against constitutional reasonableness); Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 312 (noting that requirements “may and do vary from state to state”); see also 
Bloom v. American Exp. Co., 222 Minn. 249, 257, 23 N.W.2d 570, 575 (1946) (“Each 
state has the right to prescribe by law how its citizens shall be brought into its 
courts.”). 
59. See 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE CIVIL RULES
ANNOTATED, Rule 1 cmt. § 1.3 (6th ed. 2017) (noting amendments to the Minnesota 
Rules in 1959, 1968, 1975, and 1985 were made in the wake of similar alterations to 
the federal rules). But see id. (noting that the Minnesota rules departed slightly from 
the federal rules in the 1990s). 
60. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4, with MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (“Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual
. . . may be served . . . by . . . following state law for serving a summons in an action 
brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the court is located or 
where service is made.”). 
62. E.g., Hukill v. Okla. Native Am. Domestic Violence Coal., 542 F.3d 794,
797–802 (10th Cir. 2008) (analyzing how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would 
interpret state law governing mail service); Sommervold v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 709 F.3d 
1234, 1236–38 (8th Cir. 2013) (analyzing whether the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota would extend the substantial compliance doctrine). 
9
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C.  Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “construed 
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”63 The 1996 amendment of Rule 1 
included these goals to conform to its federal counterpart,64 and 
applied them to “all aspects of judicial administration.”65 Although 
the federal courts’ interpretations of their own rules are instructive,66 
the Minnesota Supreme Court remains the ultimate authority on the 
interpretation of the Minnesota Rules.67 Furthermore, the rules are 
not to be read in isolation, but “in light of one another . . . according 
to their purpose.”68 The court has noted at times that unambiguous 
rules will be interpreted by their plain meaning.69 Yet, at other times, 
the court has stated that the rules should be liberally construed to 
administer justice and to reflect a preference for deciding actions on 
their merits.70  
Before examining the specifics of service rules in Minnesota, it 
is important to note marked differences between the Minnesota and 
Federal Rules. First, service of process attempted in a manner not 
prescribed by Minnesota law is typically deemed ineffective.71 In 
63. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
64. Compare id., with FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (providing that the rules “should be
construed, administered, and employed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding” (emphasis added)). 
65. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment.
66. T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Constr., L.L.C., 773 N.W.2d 783, 787 n.3
(Minn. 2009) (citing In re Commodore Hotel Fire & Explosion Case, 318 N.W.2d 
244, 246 (Minn. 1982)). 
67. See MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017); Mingen v. Mingen, 679 N.W.2d 724, 727
(Minn. 2004) (“We interpret our rules of civil procedure de novo.”). 
68. Mingen, 679 N.W.2d at 727.
69. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn. 2016); Walsh v. U.S. Bank,
N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014); see also Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 
421 (Minn. 2006). 
70. Commandeur, L.L.C. v. Howard Hartry, Inc., 724 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn.
2006); Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 512, 162 N.W.2d 194, 197 (1968). 
71. Compare Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn.
1997) (holding that attempted service to an occupational therapist of a medical 
center was improper because the therapist was not a “managing agent” of the center 
and it was therefore uncertain that the center would receive notice), with O’Sell v. 
Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that service to the 
stepson of the appellant was proper because the family relationship between the 
stepson and the appellant established a nexus which created a reasonable assurance 
the appellant would receive notice).  
10
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contrast, federal court service may be completed by following state 
law in the court where the action is brought, or the state where 
service is being made.72 Second, a civil action in Minnesota is 
commenced (1) when the summons is served upon a defendant; (2) 
when the defendant acknowledges or consents to alternative means 
of service; or (3) when the summons is delivered to the county sheriff 
where a defendant resides.73 Under the Federal Rules, an action is 
“commenced by filing [the] complaint with the court.”74 The 
differences between the two sets of rules can significantly impact 
procedural issues such as statutes of limitations.75 
The Minnesota Rules provide several means to effectuate service 
on an individual, which is the primary focus of this Note. The first 
and most commonly utilized mode of service is called “personal 
service.”76 Personal service can be completed in one of three ways: 
(1) by delivering a summons to the individual personally; (2) by 
leaving a copy at the individual’s “usual place of abode” with a 
“person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein” (also 
referred to as “substituted service”);77 or (3) by serving an agent 
authorized by statute to accept service on a defendant’s behalf.78 
Second, service can be effectuated by mailing a summons and 
complaint to the defendant, conditioned on the defendant’s signing 
and timely returning the required acknowledgement form.79 Finally, 
three weeks’ published notice is sufficient as a means of service in 
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1).
73. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01 (a)–(c).
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. Notably, certain statutory procedures in Minnesota provide
for commencement upon filing, which are excepted from and take precedent over 
the rules. See MINN. R. CIV. P. app. A. 
75. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04(a) (“Any action that is not filed with the court
within one year of commencement against any party is deemed dismissed with 
prejudice . . . unless the parties within that year sign a stipulation to extend the filing 
period.”). 
76. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03.
77. See, e.g., MacLean v. Lasley, 181 Minn. 379, 232 N.W. 632 (1930); see also 1
DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE RULES ANNOTATED, Rule 
4.03 cmt. § 4.9 (6th ed. 2017). 
78. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a) (emphasis added). For a list of statutes providing
for appointment of an agent for service, see HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 77. 
79. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05. Unless able to show good cause, a defendant is
assessed service costs for failure to timely acknowledge service. Id. Cost avoidance 
provides incentive for a defendant to waive service, though service by mail may be 
ill-advised when nearing the running of the limitations period. See HERR & HAYDOCK,
supra note 77, Rule 4 cmt. § 4.1.  
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some circumstances.80 When publication is permitted, a plaintiff 
must file an affidavit with the court;81 but, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court requires a plaintiff to show “due diligence” in searching for 
the intended recipient before relying on publication.82 Moreover, 
“[b]ecause ‘service by publication is in derogation of the common 
law,’ the prescribed requirements for such service ‘must be strictly 
complied with.’”83 Publication is infrequently used and is a poor 
method of providing a party with actual notice.84   
D.  Substitute Service 
1. Usual Place of Abode
The first requirement for substitute service is that the summons 
be left at the intended recipient’s “usual place of abode.”85 The 
determination of a person’s usual place of abode is a question of fact 
that is only reversible when clearly erroneous.86 Additionally, an 
individual’s “usual place of abode” is not necessarily synonymous 
80. Rule 4.04(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides a list of
the five enumerated instances in which publication will be deemed effective with 
three weeks’ published notice. 
81. See id. (“The affidavit shall state . . . that the affiant believes the defendant
is not a resident of the state or cannot be found therein, and either that the affiant 
has mailed a copy of the summons to the defendant at the defendant’s place of 
residence or that such residence is not known to the affiant.”). 
82. Van Rhee v. Dysert, 154 Minn. 32, 34–35, 191 N.W. 53, 53–54 (1922); see
Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 737 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d on 
other grounds (holding that a search was diligent when a creditor conducted internet 
and bankruptcy searches, in addition to hiring a private investigator). Notably, this 
seems to satisfy the federal standard set forth in Mullane, which allows publication 
as a substitute method when it is “not reasonably possible or practicable to give more 
adequate warning.” Mullane v. Central Hannover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
317 (1950). 
83. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008) (quoting
Wilk v. Russell, 173 Minn. 580, 583, 218 N.W. 110, 111 (1928)). 
84. 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE ANNOTATED,
Rule 4.04 cmt. § 4.15 (6th ed. 2017); see Paul Fling, Note, Civil Procedure: Notifying 
Justice: “Reasonable Actual Notice” in Service of Process—DeCook v. Olmstead Medical 
Center, Inc., 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 181, 213–14 (2017) (suggesting that the 
allowance of electronic methods of publication would more effectively provide 
notice than traditional publication). 
85. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a).
86. Peterson v. Eishen, 495 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d, 512
N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1994). 
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with the domicile requirement for diversity purposes.87 Prior to the 
adoption of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, a person’s usual 
abode meant one’s “fixed place of residence”88 or “customary 
dwelling.”89 In Lovin v. Hicks, a married man’s usual abode was where 
his wife and family resided.90 For married men, the Lovin standard 
became the presumption.91  
In addition to this presumption, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
considered particular circumstances when determining a person’s 
usual place of abode. In Murtha v. Olson, the supreme court reversed 
the lower court’s ruling that a friend’s farm, where the defendant 
kept horses and stayed overnight on occasion, qualified as a “place 
of usual abode.”92 The Minnesota Supreme Court has continued to 
employ a similar approach in more recent cases. In Patterson v. Wu 
Family Corp., service was held ineffective at an individual’s parents’ 
home when he had moved to a new permanent residence.93  
Even so, it is not always clear whether the abode requirement is 
met. In Lundgren v. Green, for example, a defendant had separated 
from (but not divorced) his wife and purchased a new home, to 
which he had moved all his individual property.94 Service was 
attempted at his wife’s house roughly five months after the two 
separated. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held such service to be 
87. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 323–24 (D. Minn.
1980) (“[O]ne’s intent to make a state his present and future home . . . is simply a 
factor of marginal weight in determining whether one’s recent former home still 
amounts to [his] ‘usual place of abode’ for service of process purposes.”). 
88. Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (1909). The court
went on to note that the term makes “primary reference to the place where the 
defendant is usually to be found.” Id. at 459, 119 N.W. at 405. Here, a man’s usual 
abode was not at the residence of his estranged wife and daughter where he had 
never resided. Id. at 460, 119 N.W. at 405.  
89. Lovin v. Hicks, 116 Minn. 179, 181, 133 N.W. 575, 576 (1911).
90. Id.
91. Berryhill, 106 Minn. at 460, 119 N.W. at 405; see also Holtberg v.
Bommersbach, 236 Minn. 335, 338, 52 N.W.2d 766, 769 (1952) (stating that such a 
“presumption . . . may be overcome by facts showing the contrary”). 
92. Murtha v. Olson, 221 Minn. 240, 245, 21 N.W.2d 607, 610 (1946) (holding
the evidence insufficient to establish defendant’s usual place of abode). 
93. 594 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 608 N.W.2d
863 (Minn. 2000); cf. Walker Emp’t Serv. Inc. v. Swanson, 278 Minn. 368, 154 
N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1967) (holding that service was proper when delivered to 
defendant’s wife at a jointly owned home while defendant had left to complete 
moving arrangements with no intent of returning).  
94. 592 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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ineffective.95 The court stated that “most importantly, [the 
defendant] had no intent to return to live at his wife’s house.”96 On 
the other hand, in Walker Employment Services, Inc. v. Swanson, the 
defendant had moved from the home he shared with his wife in 
preparation for starting a new job out of state.97 His wife had stayed 
behind to complete certain moving arrangements.98 Though the 
defendant had no intention to return—as evidenced by his taking all 
of his personal belongings with him—his former residence 
remained his “usual place of abode” for purposes of substitute 
service.99 
2. Suitable Age and Discretion
The second requirement for substitute service is that the 
summons be left with a resident of the abode who is of “suitable age 
and discretion.”100 Satisfaction of this requirement is a question of 
fact.101 Prior to the promulgation of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, attaining fourteen years of age was prima facie evidence 
of meeting the age and discretion requirements.102 However, this 
standard did not provide a minimum-age requirement. For example, 
in Holmen v. Miller, the court rejected the notion that a thirteen-year-
old was not suitable to accept substitute service as a matter of law, 
holding that such service was effective.103 The Holmen court 
distinguished between cases in which a child was the intended 
95. Id.
96. Id.; accord Holtberg v. Bommersbach, 236 Minn. 335, 338, 52 N.W.2d 766,
769 (1952). The court did suggest that a person’s temporary absence from his or 
her usual place of abode would not necessarily terminate its designation as such if 
the person contemplated returning. Lundgren, 592 N.W.2d at 891. 
97. 278 Minn. 368, 368–69, 154 N.W.2d 823, 824 (1967).
98. Id. at 369, 154 N.W.2d at 824.
99. Id.
100. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
 101. Am. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Peterson, No. C3-88-138, 1988 WL 88534, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1988). 
102. Compare Temple v. Norris, 53 Minn. 286, 286, 55 N.W. 133, 133 (1893) 
(using age as criteria to determine sufficiency of service), with Holmen v. Miller, 296 
Minn. 99, 105, 206 N.W.2d 916, 920 (1973) (holding that the mere fact that the 
individual with whom the document was left was only age thirteen as insufficient to 
render service ineffective); see also Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214, 219 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (“Absent evidence to the contrary, a person is presumed to 
be ‘as well informed, and as capable’ as an ordinary individual of the same age.” 
(quoting Temple, 53 Minn. at 288–89, 55 N.W. at 134)). 
103. 296 Minn. 99, 105, 206 N.W.2d 916, 920. 
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recipient of process versus the person with whom process is left on 
behalf of the intended recipient, noting,  
In the first example, the 13-year-old defendant has a 
responsibility to read and understand the process and to 
take appropriate action such as retaining counsel and 
responding to the process . . . . In the second example, the 
13-year-old is merely acting as a conduit for the process . . . 
[and] does not have to respond personally in any way.104 
Thus, the court found that it was not necessary for an individual 
to understand the nature or legal meaning of the process to 
effectively accept substitute service.105 The Minnesota judiciary has 
taken an approach similar to that of the federal courts in its apparent 
avoidance of imposing a bright line age requirement.106 Finally, it is 
important to note that once a plaintiff has submitted evidence of 
effective service, it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the 
recipient is not of suitable age and discretion.107 
3. “Then Residing Therein”
The third and final requirement for effective substitute service 
under Rule 4.03(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure is for 
the recipient to be “then residing therein.”108 Like the 
aforementioned requirements, Minnesota courts have treated the 
residency requirement as a question of fact.109 In one instance, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a person’s mere presence at a 
104. Id. at 104, 206 N.W.2d at 919. 
 105. Id.; accord Peterson v. W. Davis & Sons, 216 Minn. 60, 66, 11 N.W.2d 800, 
804 (1943) (“It is not necessary that the person upon whom substituted service is 
made shall understand the legal import of the papers.” (citation omitted)).  
106. See, e.g., Republic Bank v. Mejia, No. 1:13–CV–150, 2014 WL 3671880, at 
*2–3 (D. Utah July 23, 2014) (allowing substitute service to be effective if made upon
an individual at least fifteen years of age); Perkins v. Johnson, No. 06–cv–01503–
REB–PAC, 2008 WL 275768, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2008) (authorizing service on 
a thirteen-year-old). 
 107. DeCook v. Olmstead Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Minn. 2016); 
Holmen v. Miller, 296 Minn. 99, 105, 206 N.W.2d 916, 920 (1973); Am. Fed. Savings 
Bank, 1988 WL 88534, at *1. 
108. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
 109. See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008) 
(stating that, for purposes of review, factual findings of the district court must be 
applied unless clearly erroneous); see also Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 
607 (Minn. 2014) (noting that the residency requirement was within the “factual 
assertions” required for substitute service). 
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property was insufficient for him to be considered a resident; thus, 
residence was something more than mere presence, but something 
less than domicile.110 However, in O’Sell v. Peterson, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals found a defendant’s stepson was residing in the 
defendant’s usual place of abode during a planned, non-custodial 
visitation.111 In O’Sell, the court looked for “a nexus between the 
individual and the defendant that establishe[d] some reasonable 
assurance that notice would reach the defendant.”112 Relying 
primarily on cases from other jurisdictions, the appellate court noted 
that a nexus could be established by a variety of factors, such as a 
relationship of confidence between the parties,113 the duration and 
frequency of an individual’s presence,114 and an individual’s intent 
to return to the abode.115  
Yet, in 2010, the court of appeals rejected the O’Sell nexus test 
for purposes of service in a criminal matter.116 Though the relevant 
text of the criminal rule was nearly identical,117 the court required 
the substitute service recipient to actually “reside[] in the same 
abode as the intended party.”118 In its 2014 decision in Walsh v. U.S. 
Bank, the Minnesota Supreme Court remained silent on the 
appropriateness of the nexus test.119 Although the court specifically 
pointed out that residency only requires something more than 
 110. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606; O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1308–09 (6th ed. 1990)). 
111. O’Sell, 596 N.W.2d at 874. 
112. Id. at 872. 
113. Id. (citing Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1967); Plushner v. 
Mills, 429 A.2d 444, 446 (R.I. 1981); Thompson v. Butler, 243 N.W. 164, 167 
(1932)). 
 114. O’Sell, 595 N.W.2d at 873 (citing Sangmeister v. McElnea, 278 So. 2d 675, 
676–77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 115. Id. (citing Holtberg v. Bommersbach, 236 Minn. 335, 338, 52 N.W.2d 766, 
768 (1952)). 
116. State v. Briard, 784 N.W.2d 421, 430–431 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 117. Compare MINN. R. CRIM. P. 22.03 (stating that a subpoena may be left with a 
person “who resides there”), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a) (stating that summons may 
be left with a person “then residing therein”). 
118. Briard, 784 N.W.2d at 430. Notably, the court also relied on Minnesota 
Supreme Court precedent governing residency in a civil case. See id. at 431 (citing 
Heffner v. Gunz, 29 Minn. 108, 109–10, 12 N.W. 342, 342 (1882)). 
119. 851 N.W.2d 598, 608 (Minn. 2014) (Gildea, C.J., concurring). 
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“mere physical presence,”120 the court twice emphasized that the 
recipient must be “residing” at the owner’s usual place of abode.121 
Moreover, when the requirements for substitute service are met, 
the intended recipient need not actually receive the summons for 
the service to be effective.122 Accordingly, this lack of an actual 
service requirement does not guarantee effective service. Therefore, 
the question remains: What is the appropriate resolution of a case in 
which a defendant has received prompt actual notice of an action, 
but the plaintiff has not strictly complied with the necessary service 
requirements?  
E.  The Actual Notice Exception 
A weighty issue surrounding substitute service in Minnesota 
centers on whether an exception to strict compliance with service 
rules exists when a party receives actual notice of an action. The 
purported exception stems from a 1980 case from the federal district 
court in Minnesota applying state law, Minnesota Mining & 
Manufacturing Co. v. Kirkevold.123 There, the court noted that rules 
governing service should be liberally construed where a defendant 
has received “prompt actual notice.”124 Though the actual notice 
exception was not uncommon in other jurisdictions,125 this case first 
introduced the exception under the Minnesota Rules.  
The court of appeals subsequently adopted the exception in a 
1986 decision, Larson v. Hendrickson.126 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court then stated in a 1988 decision, Thiele v. Stich, that “[a]ctual 
120. Id. at 606. 
121. Id. (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a)).  
122. See, e.g., MacLean v. Lasley, 181 Minn. 379, 379, 232 N.W. 632, 632 (1930). 
123. 87 F.R.D. 317 (D. Minn. 1980). 
124. Id. at 323. 
125. See Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to find that leaving a copy of the summons and 
complaint at a home in which the defendant’s wife still resided, even though the 
defendant never planned to return, satisfied abode service); Bernier v. Schaefer, 
144 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ill. 1957) (stating that a mailed affidavit lacking details such 
as place of mailing complied substantially with the rule governing mail notice of 
certain notices); Liberty Realty, Inc. v. Kenneth Co., 69 A.2d 784, 785 (Md. 1949) 
(holding that notice substantially complied with the statute despite not following 
the statute’s language). 
 126. 394 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (liberally construing the abode 
requirement (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 323 (D. 
Minn. 1980))). 
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notice will not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction absent 
substantial compliance with Rule 4.”127 Thiele became an oft-cited 
decision for cases concerning substitute service in the Minnesota 
state courts.128 Thus, if a plaintiff had demonstrated actual notice 
and substantially complied with Rule 4, courts would find that the 
service was effective.129  
In a recent decision, Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., the Minnesota 
Supreme Court seemed to embrace a stricter application of Rule 
4.130 The defendant, who had received actual notice, alleged that the 
recipient who accepted service on his behalf was not a resident of 
the property, but an occupant.131 The court declared this averment 
an adequate challenge to substitute service.132 The court did not 
mention substantial compliance, but only noted that “mere physical 
presence” was insufficient to establish residency.133 Still, this opinion 
left the supreme court’s stance on the actual notice exception 
unclear. A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Jaeger v. 
Palladium Holdings, LLC, dispensed with any lingering uncertainties. 
III. JAEGER DECISION
A.  Facts & Procedural History 
In August 1997, Stephen Jaeger (“Jaeger”) purchased a 
townhome in the Skyehill  Townhomes Association (“Skyehill”) 
 127. 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1988). The court also noted that this 
exception is limited to substitute service at a defendant’s residence. Id. 
 128. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Minn. 
2011); Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997); Koski 
v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
129. Compare Smith v. Flotterud, 716 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (leaving
notice with the defendant’s neighbor, who passed it on to the defendant’s 
granddaughter, who then gave it to her mother, who then gave it to the defendant, 
was not in substantial compliance with service requirements), with Van Note v. 2007 
Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (leaving notice at the intended 
recipient’s home with an adult who said she would give it to the intended recipient 
was substantial compliance). 
130. 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014). 
131. Id. at 606–07. 
132. Id. at 607. 
133. Id. Notably, the concurrence explicitly called for a restrictive, plain 
meaning approach to substitute service; see id. at 607–09 (Gildea, C.J., concurring) 
(noting that if Jane Doe was not a roommate of defendant, then service would have 
been ineffective). 
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development in St. Louis Park, Minnesota.134 In 2011, Jaeger began 
managing a car dealership in Wisconsin.135 As a result, Jaeger rarely 
stayed at the property.136 Jaeger authorized his adult son, J.C., to care 
for the property in his absence.137 J.C. visited the townhome 
approximately twenty to thirty times per year, but had stayed 
overnight on no more than a few occasions.138 As caretaker, J.C. 
could access the property at his pleasure.139 Additionally, J.C. could 
receive mail at the property, though this occurred only once.140 After 
visiting the townhome, J.C. would contact Jaeger to notify him that 
the property was in good condition.141  
In May 2010, Jaeger became delinquent on his dues to 
Skyehill.142 Skyehill obtained a lien on the property, and 
subsequently foreclosed by advertisement.143 Upon purchasing the 
property at the foreclosure sale, Skyehill assigned the Certificate of 
Sale to Franklin Financial, LLC (“Franklin”).144 Jaeger failed to 
redeem the property within six months, and Franklin transferred the 
property to Palladium Holdings, LLC (“Palladium”).145 Eviction 
proceedings concluded in February 2013.146 
Jaeger then brought an action for declaratory judgment, 
asserting that the foreclosure was void for ineffective service.147 The 
record demonstrated that a process server had attempted to serve 
134. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., 884 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Minn. 2016). 
135. Id. 
136. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. A14-0803, 2015 WL 1513982, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015), aff’d as modified, 884 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2016).
According to Jaeger, he visited the Twin Cities twice per month and stayed at the 
townhome fewer than twenty times over a span of three years. Id. at 601. 
 137. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 603. J.C.’s caretaking duties included activating 
the home’s heating and air-conditioning systems, running the water, and various 
other maintenance jobs. Id. 
138. Id. 
 139. See id. (noting that J.C. had a garage-door opener and could “visit the 
property at anytime”). 
140. Id. (stating that J.C. once received a motor-vehicle registration at the 







147. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2014) (mandating that service as required 
in a civil action must occur at least four weeks prior to sale). 
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J.C. at the townhome.148 The district court determined the 
attempted service to be ineffective.149 The court adopted a strict 
interpretation of Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a) based 
on its finding that Jaeger had not received actual notice of the 
foreclosure.150 Under this application, J.C. was not “residing” on 
Jaeger’s property151—a requirement for substitute service.152 The 
district court ruled that the foreclosure sale was thereby void and 
awarded the property to Jaeger.153 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
ruling in a two to one decision.154 Because a defendant’s receipt of 
actual notice suggested the fulfillment of due process, the appellate 
court noted that substantial compliance with the rules governing 
substitute service was sufficient.155 However, the appellate court 
confirmed the finding that Jaeger did not receive actual notice, 
meaning that strict compliance was required.156 The court stated that 
actual notice was “the determinative factor regarding whether the 
rule requires strict or substantial compliance.”157  
Conversely, the dissent argued for the application of a 
“functional” approach to substitute service, whereby service need 
only give a “reasonable assurance” of notice reaching the intended 
recipient.158 Instead of strictly construing the residency requirement, 
the dissent would have inquired if a “sufficient nexus” existed 
 148. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 603. The individual who accepted service signed “J.C. 
Jaeger,” and the process server’s standard practice was to ask whoever answers the 
door whether they live in the residence. Id. 
 149. Id. at 604. The district court determined that service to Jaeger’s son did not 
constitute a valid method of substitute service. Id. 
 150. Id. The court empaneled an advisory jury to resolve the factual dispute 
regarding whether Jaeger had indeed received actual notice. Id. at 603.  
151. Id. (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a)). 
 152. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a) (requiring an individual to be served either 
personally or by “leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode with some 
person . . . then residing therein”). 
153. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 603. 
154. See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. A14-0803, 2015 WL 1513982 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015). 
155. Id. at *1–2 (citing O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
156. Id. at *3. 
 157. Id. (citing Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); 
see also Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); 
Larson v. Hendrickson, 394 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010)). 
158. Id. at *5 (Connolly, J., dissenting) (citing O’Sell, 595 N.W.2d at 872). 
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between the intended recipient and individual who was served on 
their behalf.159 Here, the dissent felt that J.C’s caretaking 
responsibilities at the property and his frequent contacts with Jaeger 
demonstrated a “nexus.”160 Despite advocating for a less stringent 
service standard, the dissent seemed to oppose an actual notice 
exception to the residency requirement.161 
B.  Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
courts’ decisions.162 The court noted two statutory notice 
requirements in foreclosure-by-advertisement proceedings: (1) 
“publication of the foreclosure sale at least [six] weeks” prior to its 
occurrence; and (2) service of the published noticed in the manner 
required in a civil action “upon the person in possession of the 
mortgaged premises.”163 Jaeger did not dispute that Skyehill met the 
publication requirement.164 Rather, Jaeger maintained that Skyehill 
had failed to comply with Rule 4.03(a) of the Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure.165 Jaeger asserted that J.C. was not “then residing” 
at the property.166 Central to the court’s analysis were (1) the 
construction and application of the residency requirement and (2) 
the court’s position on the purported actual notice exception.167 
First, the court employed a plain meaning approach in 
determining that “then residing therein” required a person 
accepting service to “have lived in the named recipient’s place of 
abode . . . for an extended period at the time when the process server 
attempted service.”168 The court noted that although no definitive 
test for residency existed, “a person’s mere physical presence at the 
owner’s usual place of abode” was insufficient for a party to accept 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at *6. 
161. Id. (“[T]he effectiveness of substitute service is not, and cannot be, based 
on what the resident chooses to do with the document . . . actual notice is neither 
necessary to nor dispositive of the effectiveness of substitute service.”). 
162. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., 884 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Minn. 2016). 
163. Id. at 604 (citing MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2010)). 
164. Id. 
165. Id.; see MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
166. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 604–05 (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a)).  
167. See id. at 606. 
168. Id. at 605. 
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substitute service.169 In adopting this approach, the court struck 
down the “functional” definition of residency—argued for by the 
appellate court’s dissent170 and originally advanced in O’Sell v. 
Peterson.171 The court refuted O’Sell as disregarding the principle that 
due process provides a “constitutional floor” that states may exceed 
by adopting their own rules of procedure.172 
Next, the court turned to the adequacy of Skyehill’s substitute 
service on J.C.173 The court found insufficient evidence that the 
district court’s finding that J.C. was not “then residing” at the 
property was clearly erroneous.174 Though J.C. was “more than just 
physically present at the townhome,” there was no evidence that he 
had ever lived there.175 Thus, the attempted substitute service was 
held ineffective under the adopted standard.176  
Finally, the most significant piece of the court’s opinion came 
in dicta.177 Though the court of appeals’ decision was affirmed, the 
supreme court disagreed with the appellate court’s emphasis on 
whether Jaeger received actual notice of the foreclosure.178 The 
court stated that actual notice was immaterial for purposes of rule 
 169. Id. at 605–06 (quoting Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 
(Minn. 2014)). 
 170. Id. at 604 (citing Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. A14–0803, 2015 
WL 1513982, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015) (Connolly, J., dissenting)). 
 171. 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). In discussing whether an 
individual is “then residing therein” as required by Rule 4.03(a), the O’Sell court 
reasoned that “there must be a nexus between the individual and the defendant,” 
establishing a “reasonable assurance” that the defendant will receive the notice. Id. 
Factors demonstrating a nexus include the parties’ relationship, the duration and 
frequency of the served individual’s presence, and an intent to return to the 
property. Id at 872–73.  
 172. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 606 (explaining that the starting point for the 
analysis is the text of Rule 4.03(a), as opposed to the constitutional question of due 
process that O’Sell analyzed).  
 173. See id. Whether service was effective is a question of law, while an 
individual’s residency presents a question of fact. Id. at 606–07. 
174. Id. at 607. 
 175. Id. Notably, Palladium conceded that J.C. lived roughly a mile down the 
road at oral argument. Id. at 608. 
176. Id.  
177. See id. (stating that Jaeger did not receive actual notice, so the exception 
was immaterial). 
 178. Id.; see Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. A14–0803, 2015 WL 
1513982, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015); Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 
214, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (“[S]ubstantial compliance with rule 4 is sufficient 
to effect service of process whe[n] the intended recipient has actual notice.”).  
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compliance.179 Rather, courts interpret service rules by their plain 
language, regardless of actual notice,180 and statutory service 
requirements must be strictly followed.181  
The court bolstered its position with a construction argument, 
noting that “[b]y using the word ‘shall’ to describe its requirements, 
Rule 4.03 mandates strict compliance with its terms.”182 The court 
did acknowledge Thiele, which suggested that substantial compliance 
was sufficient when a party received actual notice.183 However, the 
court rejected such an application of Thiele, noting that the relevant 
language was dicta and therefore descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive, in nature.184 Furthermore, whether there was strict or 
substantial compliance was immaterial to Thiele’s outcome, and, 
therefore, nonbinding.185 Instead, the court indicated that its 1930 
holding, MacLean v. Lasley,186 was controlling in its decision.187 The 
court noted that MacLean predated the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but found this distinction to be unimportant.188 
Accordingly, the court stated that “substitute service is subject to 
strict compliance regardless of the circumstances.”189  
 179. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 609 (citing MacLean v. Lasley, 181 Minn. 379, 380, 
232 N.W. 632, 632 (1930)).  
 180. Id. (citing Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 2016); 
Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 383 (Minn. 2008)). 
 181. Id. (citing Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 460, 119 N.W. 404, 405 (1909); 
In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2013)). 
182. Id. (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03). 
 183. Id. at 610; see Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980) (“Actual 
notice will not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction absent substantial 
compliance with Rule 4.”).  
184. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 610 (“By using words such as ‘may’ and ‘recognized’ 
to describe the exception, we were . . . not determining that such an exception 
actually existed.”) (quoting Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584)).  
 185. See id. at 610–11 (“In [Thiele], it made no difference whether we evaluated 
the service for strict or substantial compliance because, under either approach, the 
service was ineffective.” (citing Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584)). 
186. 181 Minn. 379, 380, 232 N.W. 632, 632 (1930). 
 187. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 609 (“[T]here is no reason to treat substitute 
service under Rule 4.03(a) any differently than we did in MacLean.”); MacLean, 181 
Minn. at 380, 232 N.W. at 632 (“In making such substituted service there must be a 
strict compliance with the statute. The necessity of the statutory service is not 
dispensed with by the mere fact that defendant may in some way learn of the 
existence of the papers and an attempted service.”). 
188. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 609. 
189. Id. 
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It is not precisely clear how broad the court intended its ruling; 
namely, if the decision applies to all rules of service.190 However, 
Jaeger unequivocally required a strict compliance with Rule 4.03(a) 
of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, thus rejecting the actual 
notice exception. 
IV. ANALYSIS
A.  Jaeger’s Limitation of Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 4.03(a) 
Comports with Plain Meaning 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 4.03(a) states that service of 
a summons may be completed “[u]pon an individual by delivering a 
copy to the individual personally or by leaving a copy at the 
individual’s usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein.”191 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
appropriately limited the application of Rule 4.03(a) to its plain 
meaning by requiring actual residency for substitute service.192 
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court possesses the power to 
regulate rules of procedure,193 the court can amend the rules to 
achieve desired practical results, as opposed to departing from their 
plain meaning. Moreover, restricting Rule 4.03(a) to its plain 
meaning best comports with jurisprudence surrounding its federal 
counterpart.194  
 190. Compare id. (“[W]e have interpreted service rules in accordance with their 
plain language regardless of whether the intended recipient has received actual 
notice of the action . . . . [W]e have also long held that ‘service must accord strictly 
with statutory requirements.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 
Minn. 458, 459, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (1909))), with id. (“Accordingly, because 
substitute service is subject to strict compliance regardless of the circumstances, it is 
irrelevant whether the intended recipient receives actual notice of the action.” 
(emphasis added)). 
191. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a) (emphasis added). 
 192. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 605 (citing State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 822 
(Minn. 2011)). 
193. MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017); see, e.g., State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 
(Minn. 1983) (explaining that the legislature has acknowledged the Supreme 
Court’s authority to regulate evidentiary matters). But see REPORT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA, supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 194. See, e.g., Waldner v. N. Am. Truck & Trailer, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 401, 416 n.3 
(D.S.D. 2011) (finding service upon a cleaning person at a defendant’s property was 
improper because she did not reside there). 
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1. The Minnesota Supreme Court has the Authority to Amend Rules
of Procedure, and Should Therefore Restrict Service Rules to Their
Plain Meaning
First, just as the legislature may repeal or amend laws, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court possesses the power to amend its rules.195 
Therefore, no compelling reasons exist why a rule governing 
substitute service—free from ambiguity—should be interpreted 
differently than a statute, which is interpreted by its plain 
meaning.196 There are few Minnesota Supreme Court cases 
definitively ruling on rule construction. Vandenheuvel v. Wagner, 
however, stated that rules should be interpreted like “statute[s] . . . 
taken and construed in the sense in which they were understood and 
intended at the time the rule was promulgated.”197 On the other 
hand, the court has instructed that the rules be liberally construed 
to effectuate their purpose of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.”198  
In light of its authority over the rules, the court has even greater 
reason to adhere to plain meaning when interpreting the rules than 
when tasked with statutory interpretation. For example, when 
interpreting a statute, the court might occasionally be faced with two 
options: (1) interpreting a statute by its plain meaning, thereby 
applying the statute in an unjust manner; or (2) finding some 
legitimate means to depart from the plain meaning to avoid a 
miscarriage of justice.199 If the court selected the first option, it 
would have no assurance that the legislature would later repeal or 
amend the statute to remedy its defects. Moreover, the court’s 
interpretation of the statute could potentially carry greater 
consequences than it had originally anticipated. Thus, a pragmatic 
court might choose the second option, construing a statute in a 
 195. See § 480.051 (providing that the supreme court has “the power to regulate 
. . . civil actions . . . by rules promulgated by it from time to time”). 
196. See, e.g., Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 
2001). 
 197. Vandenheuvel v. Wagner, 690 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn. 2005) (quoting 
House v. Hanson, 245 Minn. 466, 473, 72 N.W.2d 874, 878 (1955)). 
 198. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1996) (quoting MINN. 
R. CIV. P. 1); Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 512, 162 N.W.2d 194, 197 
(1968) (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
 199. See, e.g., State v. Vill. of Pierz, 241 Minn. 37, 41–43, 62 N.W.2d 498, 501–02 
(1954) (inferring legislative intent and departing from a revised statute’s plain 
meaning because the statute was “not so unambiguous that there [was] no room for 
judicial construction”).  
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manner that may appear to circumvent its plain meaning. Of course, 
the legislature may then attempt to paper over the court’s decision. 
However, a new bill or repeal must garner the requisite political 
support for enactment,200 and little assurance exists of successful 
passage through both houses.201 A court could thus be particularly 
motivated to depart from statutory plain meaning to eschew 
continued or future injustice.202  
Conversely, when interpreting its rules of procedure, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has far less reason to depart from plain 
meaning. While the court may be faced with an undesirable 
application of its rules in some instances, the court is not without the 
tools to later remedy that which it considers unjust.203 The court 
need not consider the potential action or inaction of a coordinate 
governmental branch when attempting to administer a fair and just 
interpretation of its rules.204 Instead, given its authority to both 
prescribe and interpret rules of procedure, the court should grant 
compliance an even greater weight when deciding what is a “just . . . 
determination.”205 Additionally, instead of departing from a rule’s 
clear and ordinary meaning,206 the court should strive to remedy 
defective rules through the amendment process, thereby giving 
 200. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, §§ 22–23 (requiring a majority approval from each 
house for passage, subject to executive veto, upon which two-thirds approval would 
be needed for passage). 
 201. See Number of Bills Introduced and Laws Passed in the Minnesota Legislature, 
1849–Present, MINN. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, https://www.leg. 
state.mn.us/lrl/history/bills (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). For example, among the 
1653 house and 1415 senate measures introduced during the eighty-ninth legislative 
session (2016), just 107 laws were enacted. Id. 
 202. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Minn. 2000) 
(“[C]ourts should construe a statute to avoid absurd results and unjust 
consequences.”); Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n, 259 Minn. 532, 543, 108 
N.W.2d 434, 441 (1961) (“The general terms of a statute are subject to implied 
exceptions founded on rules of public policy and the maxims of natural justice so 
as to avoid absurd and unjust consequences.”). 
203. See MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017). 
 204. But cf. id. (statutory authorization of rulemaking power to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court could allow for an inference that the legislative branch possesses 
rulemaking authority). Of course, this point is far from settled. See discussion supra 
Part II(A)(2). In any event, the state legislature has shown substantial deference to 
the supreme court regarding its interpretation of Rule 4. See discussion infra Part 
IV.A.3.
205. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 206. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. (recounting the federal courts’ amorphous 
construction of the Rule 4 residency requirement).  
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parties fair and clear notice of correct procedure. Proactive 
measures to provide such clarity—such as conveying the court’s 
intended application in the plain meaning of the rules—would 
facilitate justice, a guiding principle of “all aspects of judicial 
administration.”207 
2. Federal Jurisprudence Governing Substitute Service Supports a
Plain Meaning Interpretation of Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure 4.03(a)
Next, the plain meaning of residency—as opposed to a nexus 
test208—is supported by the federal courts’ treatment of substitute 
service requirements. As noted in Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 
“[w]here [Minnesota] rules of procedure parallel the federal rules, 
‘federal cases interpreting the federal rule are helpful and 
instructive but not necessarily controlling’ on . . . interpretation of 
the state counterpart.”209 The federal rule governing abode service 
is nearly identical to Minnesota’s rule.210 Thus, the federal courts’ 
interpretation of “resides there” is helpful in assessing the 
appropriate interpretation of Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
4.03(a).211  
Federal courts’ general attitude toward Rule 4’s construction is 
accurately reflected by an excerpt from the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in 
Nowell v. Nowell:  
[Rule 4(d)(1)] should be broadly construed where the 
defendant, as in this case, received notice of the suit. This 
rule of construction is, of course subject to the limitation 
that the construction of the statute’s language must be a 
natural rather than an artificial one . . . . [T]he 
207. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment. 
208. See cases cited supra notes 111–16. 
209. 608 N.W.2d 863, 867 n.4 (Minn. 2000) (citing Johnson v. Soo Line R.R. 
Co., 463 N.W.2d 894, 899 n.7 (Minn. 1990)). 
 210. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B) (authorizing service on an individual “of 
suitable age and discretion who resides there” (emphasis added)), with MINN. R. CIV. 
P. 4.03(a) (authorizing service on individual “of suitable age and discretion then 
residing therein” (emphasis added)). 
 211. See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1096, n.33 (4th ed. 2017) (noting that 
prior to a 2007 restyling revision, Rule 4(2)(B) also used the language “then 
residing therein”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment 
(disclosing that the amendments were “intended to be stylistic only”). 
27
Cochran: Civil Procedure: You've Been Served . . . Or Have You?—Jaeger v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
2018] THE RESIDE REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTITUTE SERVICE 301 
practicalities of the particular fact situation determine 
whether service meets the requirements.212 
This approach has led to a muddled history of jurisprudence 
governing the residency requirement set forth by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4. Still, analysis of the relevant decisional law is 
helpful. Notably, federal district courts have overwhelmingly held 
that attempted substitute service is ineffective when made on 
cleaning persons and housekeepers who do not actually reside at a 
property.213  
Conversely, support exists for the sufficiency of substitute 
service made on maids or cleaning persons who do live at a 
defendant’s abode,214 thus lending great weight to Jaeger’s emphasis 
on actual residency.215 Still, federal courts have taken varied 
approaches when faced with different scenarios. For example, a 
property manager, living in a separate building within the same 
apartment complex as the defendant, was held to be residing at the 
defendant’s abode.216 Such an application would seemingly fail 
under the Jaeger standard. Conversely, another federal court found 
abode service to be ineffective when made on a defendant’s adult 
daughter who lived in the same apartment building.217  
More perplexing still, some federal courts have found doormen 
of apartment complexes to qualify as residing at a defendant’s abode 
212. 384 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 213. See Waldner v. N. Am. Truck & Trailer, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 401, 416 n.3 (D.S.D. 
2011) (finding service upon a cleaning person at a defendant’s property was 
improper because she did not reside there); Klopas v. Fieldsheer Team Sports, Inc., 
No. 98 C 7427, 1999 WL 519299, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1999) (holding that a part-
time housekeeper working in a defendant’s home was not residing therein); Polo 
Fashions Inc. v. B. Bowman & Co., 102 F.R.D. 905, 907–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding 
a housekeeper not living at the property was not residing therein); Franklin Am., 
Inc. v. Franklin Cast Prods., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 645, 647 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (“[A] part-
time housekeeper who did not live in the [defendant’s] home . . . cannot be 
deemed to have been ‘residing therein’ without placing an artificial construction 
on the language of the rule.”). 
214. See, e.g., Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1957); Barclays Bank of 
N.Y. v. Goldman, 517 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 215. See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., 884 N.W.2d 601, 606–08 (Minn. 
2016) (spending a considerable amount of time confirming that the son lived about 
a mile away and did not live at his father’s property). 
216. Nowell, 384 F.2d at 953–54. 
 217. See Di Leo v. Shin Shu, 30 F.R.D. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (“[A]partments in 
a multiple dwelling are, in a sense, as separate and distinct as individual buildings 
under separate roofs.”). 
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for substitute service.218 The doorman application certainly conflicts 
with the Jaeger standard. Finally, proponents of a more inclusive 
residency standard might find support from M. Lowenstein & Sons, 
Inc. v. Austin.219 There, a defendant’s twenty-one-year-old daughter 
was home from college to stay “at least overnight.”220 The court held 
that she fell within Rule 4’s “then residing” requirement.221 However, 
the court’s decision was influenced by the fact that the daughter was 
“returning” to a home at which she had previously resided.222 Thus, 
given the likelihood that she had no other permanent residence, a 
case could be made that Lowenstein comports with the Jaeger plain 
meaning standard for residency.223  
It is important to recall that the federal courts’ decisions 
regarding the residency requirement are only instructive on the 
Jaeger standard. Moreover, given the federal courts’ varied 
approaches, there may be no definitive answer to whether federal 
jurisprudence supports the Jaeger standard. Still, given that J.C. was 
serving as a caretaker and living at least a mile away from his father’s 
townhome,224 his situation is most analogous to those cases involving 
service on cleaning persons or maids who did not actually live at a 
property.225 In fact, J.C. was present at the property with far less 
regularity than the typical housekeeper.226 Thus, holding that J.C. 
 218. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Perinovic, 152 F.R.D. 128, 131 (N.D. Ill. 1993); 
Three Crown Ltd. P’ship v. Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 
see also 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1096 (4th ed. 2017) (suggesting such support 
stems from the obligation of doormen, cleaning persons, and property managers to 
relay information). 
219. 430 F. Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
220. Id.  
221. Id.  
222. Id. (“Rule 4(d)(1) is broad enough to include a student returning home 
from college.” (emphasis added)). 
 223. Compare id. (noting the federal rule accounts for a “student returning home 
from college [who] stay[s] at least overnight at her parents’ residence” (emphasis 
added)), with Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., 884 N.W.2d 601, 608 (“The plain 
and ordinary meaning of the word ‘reside,’ of which ‘residing’ is a form, is ‘[t]o live 
in a place permanently or for an extended period.’” (quoting THE AM. HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANG. 1493 (5th ed. 2011) (emphasis added))).  
224. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 608. 
 225. See cases cited supra note 213 (providing examples of cases in which service 
was ineffective). 
226. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 603 (noting that J.C. visited the property “an 
estimated 20 to 30 times per year”). 
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was not “then residing therein”227 comports with the interpretation 
adopted by the federal courts in decisions most analogous to Jaeger. 
3. Bottom Line: Residency
While the O’Sell nexus test228 may seem practical, it does not 
comport with the plain meaning of “then residing therein.”229 In 
Jaeger, the facts could not characterize J.C. as dwelling continuously 
at the townhome at the time of attempted service because he had 
only stayed at the property a few times in three years.230 If a literal 
residency requirement was not the intended effect of Rule 4.03(a), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court possesses the power to amend it 
accordingly. The court could omit the words “then residing 
therein”231 or make exceptions for classes of people entrusted with a 
certain level of responsibility at a defendant’s abode. However, the 
court did not do so. Moreover, the legislature arguably possesses 
authority to prescribe procedural laws that supersede Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure.232 But the legislative branch has remained 
silent on the residency requirement, giving no sign of an intent to 
allow substitute service upon those not actually “residing” at a 
defendant’s property. In fact, some procedural statutes expressly 
defer to the Minnesota Rules for civil service.233 Thus, Jaeger properly 
restricted the residency requirement of Rule 4.03(a) to its plain 
meaning.  
227. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
 228. See O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872–73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) 
(noting that a nexus can be established by factors like a relationship of confidence, 
duration and frequency of visits, and intent to return). 
229. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a); see MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1060, 1295 (11th ed. 2003) (noting that “residing” is a present participle of “reside,” 
which means to “dwell permanently or continuously,” and defining “then” as “at 
that time”). 
230. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 603.  
231. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
232. See MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2016). 
233. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2016) (“[N]otice shall be served in like manner 
as a summons in a civil action in the district court.”). 
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B.  Jaeger Properly Rejected the Actual Notice Exception to Substitute 
Service 
In Jaeger, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the actual 
notice exception advanced by both the district court234 and court of 
appeals.235 Under the purported exception, “substantial 
compliance” with substitute service requirements is sufficient when 
a party receives actual notice of the action.236 However, both 
precedent and practical application support the court’s rejection of 
the actual notice exception under the current rule. 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court Adhered to Stare Decisis in
Rejecting an Actual Notice Exception
First, despite conflicting commentary,237 the supreme court 
adhered to principles of stare decisis by requiring strict compliance 
with Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a). While the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals has voiced its approval of a substantial 
compliance requirement with Rule 4.03(a) when there is actual 
notice, only three times—at least arguably—has the exception 
controlled in decisions involving substitute service.238 While not 
binding on the supreme court, examining the jurisprudence of each 
decision merits consideration. 
The actual notice exception was first introduced by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals in Larson v. Hendrickson.239 There, 
process was served on the tenant of a house owned by the defendant. 
 234. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. 27CV133083, 2014 WL 1660395, 
at *2, *4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2014) (citing O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 
872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)). 
235. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. A14–0803, 2015 WL 1513982, at 
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn.
1988); Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); Van Note v. 
2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010))). 
236. Jaeger, 2015 WL 1513982, at *1 (citing Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584). 
 237. See HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 77, § 4.9 (“Substantial compliance with . . . 
[Rule 4.03(a)] is sufficient . . . if the intended recipient has actual notice of the 
service.”). 
238. See O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); 
Pederson v. Clarkson Lindley Trust, 519 N.W.2d 234, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); 
Larson v. Hendrickson, 394 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 239. Larson, 394 N.W.2d at 526 (“When actual notice of the action is received by 
the intended recipient, ‘the rules governing such service should be liberally 
construed.’” (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 323 (D. 
Minn. 1980))).  
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The defendant had resided in the house for eight years, but moved 
to a motel in Florida two months prior to service.240 The defendant 
intended to remain in Florida, where he had obtained 
employment.241 Additionally, he received mail and opened a 
checking account in Florida.242 On the other hand, the defendant 
had yet to obtain permanent residence in Florida, stored business 
equipment in Minnesota, renewed his teaching license in 
Minnesota, and even moved back to the house in Minnesota for 
several months after service took place.243 Employing the actual 
notice exception, the court held that substitute service was effective 
under a liberal construction of the abode requirement.244  
In Pederson v. Clarkson Lindley Trust, plaintiffs served a trust by 
leaving a summons with a co-trustee’s wife at the trustee’s abode 
pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 4.03(a).245 The 
defendants challenged the effectiveness of the service, given that 
Rule 4.03(a) was silent regarding personal service on trusts.246 
However, grounding its decision in the actual notice exception and 
the underlying goals of the rules, the court of appeals held that 
substitute service was effective.247 The court reasoned that it was fair 
and equitable to treat the trust as an individual because the trust 
operated out of the co-trustee’s home, was not listed in any 
telephone directory, maintained no public identity or activity, and 
functioned exclusively through the co-trustees.248 
Finally, in O’Sell v. Peterson, the court of appeals was tasked with 
determining the sufficiency of substitute service upon a defendant’s 
fourteen-year-old stepson during the child’s six-day, non-custodial 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 525. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 526. The defendant did, however, sell the house shortly after his 
return. Id. at 525. 
 244. Id. Examination of the opinion indicates the possibility that the court’s 
analysis of the abode requirement may have been diluted with doctrines like 
domicile or residency. See id. at 526 (“[Defendant]’s usual place of abode was 
Minnesota for the purpose of service of process.” (emphasis added)). 
245. 519 N.W.2d 234, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. (quoting Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 190 
N.W.2d 651, 656 (1971)); MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The rules] shall be construed . . . to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”). 
 248. Pederson, 519 N.W.2d at 235–36. The court noted that the co-trustee did 
“virtually nothing to apprise the public that the . . . Trust operates in any way other 
than through him out of his home.” Id. at 235. 
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visitation.249 The child’s visits were planned and occurred weekly. 
Furthermore, the child sometimes slept and ate at the defendant’s 
abode for as long as two weeks consecutively.250 Thus, although the 
court relied on a “nexus test,”251 service would very likely have been 
found compliant under the Jaeger standard. 
In any event, the appellate court’s occasional application of the 
actual notice exception was nonbinding on the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. In fact, the rarity of the exception’s application amid its 
continued recognition may denote its unworkability.252 The 
appellate court’s proclamation of the actual notice exception to 
substitute service has repeatedly come in dicta, or, when noted, is 
not actually applied for any numbers of reasons.253 The exception 
has been applied in appellate decisions involving other methods of 
service, though only those involving technical defects of service form. 
In Times Square Shopping Center v. Tobacco City, for example, a plaintiff 
failed to comply with a statutory provision requiring that an eviction 
summons “shall state that the . . . original [complaint] has been filed 
with the district court.”254 Personal service was held effective despite 
the technical error, as actual notice had been provided. The court 
249. 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
250. Id. at 873. 
251. See cases cited supra notes 111–16. The referenced cases discuss the nexus 
test and its qualifying relationships, such as relationships of confidence and familial 
relationships. 
 252. See infra Part IV.B.2. (discussing the demonstrable unworkability of the 
actual notice exception in other jurisdictions). 
 253. See Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) 
(noting that an officer’s testimony that a third party lived with the intended 
recipient was “undisputed”); Sitek v. Sitek, No. A09-2339, 2010 WL 2900344, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 2010) (holding that because the wife did not receive actual 
notice, she was not served); Smith v. Flotterud, 716 N.W.2d 378, 382–83 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006) (holding that service upon an unrelated third party living at the 
defendant’s nursing home did not substantially comply with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03); 
Niesznner v. St. Paul Sch. Dist. No. 625, 643 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding the substantial compliance exception inapplicable because “appellant did 
not attempt to serve respondent in accordance with either rule 4.03 or rule 4.05”); 
Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 594 N.W.2d 540, 547–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“Because service was not made at [the defendant]’s usual place of abode, the actual 
notice exception does not apply in this case.”); Lundgren v. Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 
892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Because the attempted substitute service was not at 
[defendant]’s ‘usual place of abode,’ there was no substantial compliance with the 
requirements of Rule 4.03(a). Thus, the actual notice exception does not apply.”).  
254. 585 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 566.05(a) (1998)).
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reasoned that substantial compliance was sufficient because a court 
date could not be scheduled without prior filing, and because the 
summons included an initialed date stamp and handwritten case 
number.255 Thus, although not explicitly mentioned in the affidavit, 
the recipient nonetheless had notice of the filing.  
Relying on Times Square, the court of appeals took a similar 
approach in an unpublished opinion, Central Internal Medicine 
Association, P.A.  v. Chilgren.256 Under the relevant statute, the 
plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney was required to sign and file an 
affidavit stating that a copy of the summons was mailed to the 
defendant’s last known address.257 The defendants conceded that 
the summons was mailed, but challenged the failure to state as much 
in the filed affidavit.258 In allowing substantial compliance, the court 
made an important distinction between form and personal service, 
finding that, “[s]imilar to the challenge to the form of the summons 
in Times Square, the [defendants] are objecting only to the form of the 
affidavit sent to the district court and not to the service of the 
summons itself.”259 In any event, both Times Square and Chilgren were 
later abrogated by the court of appeals.260  
More importantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has intimated 
its support for an actual notice exception to substitute service only 
twice.261 As the court noted in Jaeger,262 however, its support in Thiele 
was dicta263 and therefore nonbinding. In Coleman, the court did 
proclaim the exception in holding substitute service effective.264 
However, the court deferred to the disciplinary referee’s factual 
findings under clear error review.265 It is unclear whether the 
255. Id. 
256. No. C2-00-36, 2000 WL 987858, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2000). 
257. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 504B.331(d)(2)(ii). 
258. Central Internal Med. Ass’n, P.A, 2000 WL 987858, at *2. 
259. Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
260. See Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
261. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1988) (“Actual notice will not 
subject defendants to personal jurisdiction absent substantial compliance with Rule 
4.”); In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Minn. 2011) 
(quoting Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584).  
262. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., 884 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Minn. 2016). 
 263. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584 (“As Stich was not effectively served within six 
years . . . the claim was time-barred.”). 
264. See Coleman, 793 N.W.2d at 302–03. Notably, Jaeger erroneously stated that 
Coleman did not involve substitute service. See Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 611 n.4 (“Like 
Thiele, none of these cases involved substitute service.”). 
265. Coleman, 793 N.W.2d at 302–03. 
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exception was a controlling factor in the decision, though the court’s 
failure to explicitly address the challenged residency requirement 
suggests that it was.  
The referee found that [defendant] had actual notice of 
the petition, and [defendant] concedes that the Director 
served the petition upon a person of suitable age and 
discretion. The referee’s finding is not clearly erroneous 
and supports the conclusion that the Director substantially 
complied with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03.266 
Thus, it is possible—likely even—that the court employed the actual 
notice exception.  
However, subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions 
evince a swift deviation from the outlying Coleman. In Walsh v. U.S. 
Bank, a defendant’s assertion that the service recipient was only an 
“occupant” of his property, as opposed to a resident, was expressly 
declared a valid challenge to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 
4.03(a).267 Though this case presented the ideal setting to allow 
substantial compliance,268 the court was silent on the actual notice 
exception. Additionally, the court stated that “[w]here the language 
is plain and unambiguous, that plain language must be followed.”269 
Additionally, the opinion twice emphasized the word “residing” 
when discussing the requirements of Rule 4.03.270 Decisions 
subsequent to Walsh and preceding Jaeger continued to declare a 
plain meaning interpretation of the rules.271 Moreover, an 
examination of Thiele suggests that any proclamation of an actual 
notice exception allowing for substantial compliance was probably 
limited to the “usual place of abode” requirement.272 
This “actual notice” exception, however, has been 
recognized only in cases involving substitute service at 
 266. Id. Still, it is unclear whether the referee made an express finding as to the 
residency issue. 
267. 851 N.W.2d 598, 607 (Minn. 2014). 
 268. An adult female was served at the defendant’s abode, and the defendant 
received actual notice. See id. The defendant only challenged the residency 
requirement. See id. at 600, 607, 608.  
269. Id. at 601 (quoting State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Minn. 2008)). 
270. Id. at 606–07. But see id. at 608 (Gildea, J., concurring) (referencing a 
potential “nexus” between the recipient and the property). 
 271. See, e.g., Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 2016); State v. 
Vang, 881 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Minn. 2016); Contractors Edge, Inc. v. Mankato, 863 
N.W.2d 765, 768 (Minn. 2015). 
272. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
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defendant’s residence. One reason for this approach is that 
there may be no place significantly more desirable for the 
papers to be left. Rule 4 is otherwise taken literally, and cannot 
be satisfied by service on defendant’s place of work or 
business.273 
The factual setting of Jaeger posed a desirable scenario for 
service on a defendant.274 Given Jaeger’s extended absence from 
Minnesota to manage a car dealership in Wisconsin,275 as well as his 
continued ownership of the St. Louis Park townhome,276 he 
presumably had an abode in Wisconsin. He could have been served 
personally under Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04277 or, if 
truly untraceable, with three weeks’ published notice.278 While 
doubts about the effectiveness of publication methods are rightfully 
raised, it still serves as a tool to combat a defendant who actively 
avoids more reasonable methods of notice. Thus, the reasons offered 
by Thiele as warranting substantial compliance with the abode 
requirement are not present for purposes of the residency 
requirement in Jaeger.  
In 1930, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that substitute 
service required strict compliance with the statute, and that it was 
“immaterial whether a defendant . . . had actual notice thereof.”279 
Though the exception made its way into the Minnesota courts, the 
supreme court has not definitively departed from this stance.280 
273. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 274. See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. 27CV133083, 2014 WL 
1660395, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2014) (noting that Jaeger works and spends 
weeks at a time in Wisconsin). 
275. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., 884 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Minn. 2016). 
276. See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, L.L.C., No. 27CV133083, 2014 WL 
1660395, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2014). 
 277. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(b); see also MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subdiv. 1(1) 
(2008) (providing for personal service on defendants located out of state who own 
real property in Minnesota).  
 278. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a) (authorizing publication upon defendants when 
they are located out of state at a residence which is unknown). 
279. MacLean v. Lasley, 181 Minn. 379, 379, 232 N.W. 632, 632 (1930). 
 280. See, e.g., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014) (holding 
that substitute service at an individual’s place of abode was ineffective when served 
on an individual who did not reside therein). But cf. In re Disciplinary Action 
Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Minn. 2011) (“[In] cases involving 
substitute service at a defendant’s residence, the rules governing service are 
‘liberally construed when the intended recipient had actual notice of the lawsuit.’” 
(quoting Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584)).  
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Thus, Jaeger best comports with precedent. In any event, the rejection 
of the actual notice exception promotes a uniform and workable 
framework for providing notice. 
2. Rejecting the Actual Notice Exception Under the Current Rule
Promotes the Most Practical Service Standard
Next, the actual notice exception should be rejected for 
purposes of workability and practical application. The Supreme 
Court has held that unambiguous rules of procedure will be read in 
accordance with their plain meaning.281 While rules of procedure 
may be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose,282 it remains 
arduous to liberally construe unambiguous language. Liberal 
construction has often led to disagreements on the bench over 
whether a provision is susceptible to more than one meaning.283  
The authorization of substantial compliance with a rule 
enhances this debate. Rather than analyzing whether the provisional 
language is plain, courts analyze whether a party’s conduct is 
substantially compliant with a rule’s plain meaning.284 Of course, this 
approach leads to inconsistent applications of the rules. Because 
different jurisdictions employ varied standards,285 effectiveness often 
 281. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 601. But see Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 
377, 382 (Minn. 2008) (explaining that the rules of procedure are to be interpreted 
“according to their purpose” (quoting Mingen v. Mingen, 679 N.W.2d 724, 727 
(Minn. 2004))). 
 282. Shamrock, 754 N.W.2d at 382 (citing Mingen v. Mingen, 679 N.W.2d 724, 
727 (Minn. 2004)); Derrick v. Drolson Co., 244 Minn. 144, 69 N.W.2d 124 (1955). 
 283. Compare, e.g., Kratzer v. Welsh Companies, LLC, 771 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Minn. 
2009) (holding unambiguous a provision requiring that “parties must have 
knowledge of and consent to a broker’s ‘act[ion] on behalf of more than one party 
to a transaction’” (quoting MINN. R. 2805.2000(1)(A) (repealed))), with id. at 27 
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]ach party asserts a reasonable interpretation of the plain 
meaning of the rule—making the rule far from ‘clear and unambiguous.’”). 
284. E.g., Larson v. Hendrickson, 394 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 285. Compare Graham v. United States, 79 F. App’x 992, 993 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In 
order for the sufficient notice exception to apply, there must be a justifiable excuse 
for the defect.”), with Bernstein v. Bd. of Trustees of Teachers’ Pension & Annuity 
Fund, 376 A.2d 563, 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (“A canvass of the cases 
dealing with the application of the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance 
indicate the following considerations: (1) the lack of prejudice to the defending 
party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general 
compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner’s 
claim; and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict compliance with 
the statute.” (internal citation omitted)), and Gregory v. Saldana, CO73988, 2015 
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becomes fact-intensive.286 Thus, substantial compliance remains an 
amorphous standard that leaves parties uncertain about the exact 
requirements for service. To deviate from the plain meaning of the 
residency requirement and allow substantial compliance has proved 
unworkable in Minnesota, as substantiated by courts’ continued 
recognition of the exception without its actual application.287  
Providing further support for the proposed unworkability is a 
brief analysis of jurisprudence from the two states that have most 
frequently declared the actual notice exception: Kansas and South 
Dakota. In Kansas, the actual notice exception—more commonly 
referred to there as “substantial compliance”—is presently derived, 
not from common law, but from express statutory authority.288 
Though the actual notice exception was originally prescribed in 
1963, the modern statute was restyled in 2010.289 Section 60-204 of 
the Kansas Statutes Annotated provides in relevant part: 
Substantial compliance with any method of serving process 
effects valid service of process if the court finds that, 
notwithstanding some irregularity or omission, the party 
served was made aware that an action or proceeding was 
pending in a specified court that might affect the party or 
the party’s status or property.290 
WL 1933158, at *4 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015) (“[S]ubstantial compliance 
requires three preconditions. One, there must have been some degree of compliance 
with the offended statutory requirements. Two, the objective nature and 
consequences of the attempted service must have made it highly probable that it 
would impart the same notice as full compliance. And three, it must in fact have 
imparted such notice, or at least sufficient notice to put the defendant on his 
defense.” (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)).  
 286. Wagner v. Truesdell, 574 N.W.2d 627, 629 (S.D. 1998) (“What constitutes 
substantial compliance with a statute is a matter depending on the facts of each 
particular case.” (citing State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418, 420 (S.D. 1982))).  
 287. See supra note 251. But see In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 
N.W.2d 296, 302 (Minn. 2011) (holding that rules governing service are liberally 
construed when substitute service is completed at a party’s place of abode). 
 288. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-204 (2016). However, the doctrine of substantial 
compliance preceded codification of the exception, as substantial compliance was 
employed by the Kansas Supreme Court dating back to the nineteenth century. See 
Sexton v. Rock Island Lumber & Mfg. Co., 30 P. 164, 165 (Kan. 1892) (considering 
whether abode service was in “substantial compliance with the statute”). 
 289. 4 SPENCER A. GARD ET AL., KANSAS LAW & PRACTICE § 60-204 (5th ed. 2016). 
The changes were intended to be stylistic only, so prior interpretations “should 
remain authoritative.” Id. 
290. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-204 (2016). 
38
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss1/8
312 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1 
An examination of Kansas’s case law subsequent to the 
exception’s codification reveals an inability to set forth a workable 
application. In Briscoe v. Getto, a “case of first impression” for the 
Kansas Supreme Court, service on a defendant’s secretary at his 
place of business did not substantially comply with conventional 
methods of personal service.291 Elsewhere, the court held that 
substantial compliance was inapplicable to the statute of limitations 
for commencement of an action, as doing so would “nullify the 
express provisions of [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-203] by extending the 
time for obtaining service of process beyond the ninety (90) day 
period provided.”292 While these cases may seem routine, they still 
leave open the question: What is substantial compliance? While 
some cases have set forth helpful rules,293 there remains no 
cognizable framework. At a minimum, it is apparent that a party 
must substantially comply with “some statutory method of service 
before the provisions of . . . 60-204 have any validating effect.”294  
In what has become a seminal case on the issue, the Kansas 
Supreme Court held that serving notice on a county counselor did 
not substantially comply with a rule requiring notice to be filed with 
the clerk or governing board of the municipality.295 This ruling was 
issued despite the county not only receiving actual notice, but also 
 291. 462 P.2d 127, 129–30 (Kan. 1969). See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-304(a) 
(1967) (listing on whom and how personal service must be made). 
292. Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807, 811 (Kan. 1980). 
 293. For example, one rule articulated by common law is the notion that a 
defendant’s knowledge of the suit must derive directly from the attempted service 
under section 60-204 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. State Bd. of Regents, Univ. 
of Kan. Med. Ctr. v. Skinner, 987 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Kan. 1999); Cook v. Cook, 83 
P.3d 1243, 1246–47 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003). 
294. Fisher v. DeCarvalho, 260 P.3d 1218, 1227 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011); accord 
Haley v. Hershberger, 485 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Kan. 1971) (superseded by statute on other 
grounds). Still, the majority of cases—some involving far more colorable attempts 
at substantial compliance—hold service ineffective. For instance, the Kansas Court 
of Appeals reversed a trial court’s ruling that mailing the petition, interrogatories, 
and requests for production constituted substantial compliance with the 
requirement to serve the summons. Cook, 83 P.3d at 1246–48. The appellate court 
also ruled that service by certified mail is not substantially compliant with a 
restricted mail requirement. Id. The court reasoned that certified mail, in contrast 
to restricted mail, “does not require the endorsements ‘return receipt requested 
showing address where delivered’ and ‘deliver to addressee only.’” Id. (quoting KAN. 
STAT. ANN. 61-1803(b) (repealed 2001)). 
295. Myers v. Bd. of City. Comm’rs, 127 P.3d 319, 325 (Kan. 2006). 
39
Cochran: Civil Procedure: You've Been Served . . . Or Have You?—Jaeger v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
2018] THE RESIDE REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTITUTE SERVICE 313 
having occasion to investigate and deny the claim.296 The court 
expounded: 
If the statutory requirements are not met, the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction over the municipality. Allowing a 
claimant to serve notice on a county counselor or anyone 
else who is not the “clerk or governing body of the 
municipality” as specified in [Kan. Stat. Ann. 2004 Supp. 
12-105b(d)] would violate the clear language . . . . The 
“substantial compliance” language does not authorize the 
court to create new methods of serving notice of claim.297 
Herein lies the impasse of the actual notice exception. Where 
substantial compliance is conceivable, it is typically synonymous with 
what could otherwise be characterized as a method of service not 
prescribed by the rules.  
The Myers court also reasoned that “[i]t is a longstanding rule 
that filing a proper notice of a claim is a prerequisite to filing an 
action with the district court against a county or other 
municipality.”298 Thus, the court seemingly adopts an approach that 
is incongruent to the statute itself. The court declared that 
substantial compliance was “compliance in respect to the essential 
matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the 
statute,”299 while simultaneously proclaiming the objective of the 
pertinent statute to be “advis[ing] the proper municipality . . . of the 
time and place of the injury and giv[ing] the municipality an 
opportunity to ascertain the character and extent of the injury 
sustained.”300 The Myers facts met both of these objectives.301 Thus, 
codification of the actual notice exception in Kansas has done little 
to remedy its patent unworkability.  
Similar to Minnesota, the actual notice exception in South 
Dakota is rooted in common law.302 Although the South Dakota rule 
296. Id. at 321. 
297. Id. at 325. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 323 (quoting Orr. v. Heiman, 12 P.3d 387, 389 (Kan. 2000)). 
300. Id. (quoting Bell v. Kansas City, Kan. Hous. Auth., 922 P.2d 1233, 1235 
(Kan. 1999)). 
 301. A federal district court applying Kansas law later reached a similar result in 
ruling that service on a vice president and general counsel of a state college was 
ineffective where a plaintiff was required to serve the president of a state college, 
the attorney general, or the assistant attorney general. Taher v. Wichita State Univ., 
No. 06–2132–KHV, 2007 WL 852364, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2007). 
302. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-4 (2017) (listing process and service rules 
40
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for abode service involves a textual departure from its Minnesota 
counterpart, it invokes a very similar meaning. The South Dakota 
rule states, in relevant part, that “[i]f the defendant cannot be found 
conveniently, service may be made by leaving a copy at the 
defendant’s dwelling with someone over the age of fourteen years 
who resides there.”303 Originally, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
required strict compliance with section 15-6-4(e), including the 
dwelling requirement.304 The actual notice exception was later 
introduced by reference to none other than Thiele v. Stich.305 In 1998, 
Wagner v. Truesdell declared that the exception was “the law of [South 
Dakota]” in a case involving personal service.306  
Similar to Minnesota and Kansas, however, subsequent South 
Dakota Supreme Court decisions declared the doctrine in various 
contexts, but failed to actually apply the exception. In R.B.O. v. Priests 
of Sacred Heart, the court noted that “[t]he statutory list of parties that 
are authorized to receive service . . . is exhaustive and compliance 
with the statute is not discretionary.”307 Again, this type of strict 
compliance reasoning leaves one to wonder how substantial 
compliance can ever be effected. Even the federal courts applying 
South Dakota state law have failed to employ the exception. For 
instance, in Sommerveld v. Wal-Mart, Inc., service on an assistant 
manager was not substantially compliant with the requirement that 
a plaintiff serve “‘the person in charge’” at a place of business.308 
Ultimately, the exception was summarily rejected by the South 
without a statutorily provided actual notice exception). South Dakota’s service rules 
are more typical than the Kansas equivalent, especially in the absence of a 
substantial compliance provision. Id. 
303. Id. § 15-6-4(e). 
 304. Johnson v. Bruflat, 186 N.W. 877, 879 (S.D. 1922); Massillon Engine & 
Thresher Co. v. Hubbard, 77 N.W. 588, 589 (S.D. 1898) (“The law is well settled that 
a statute authorizing substituted service must be strictly followed.”). 
305. Wagner v. Truesdell, 574 N.W.2d 627, 629 (S.D. 1998) (“We agree with the 
Minnesota Supreme Court that actual notice coupled with substantial compliance 
is sufficient to satisfy personal service of process requirements and we hereby adopt 
that holding as the law of our state.” (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 584 
(Minn. 1988))). 
 306. Id. The holding did not come without vigorous dissent. See id. at 631 
(Henderson and Amundson, JJ., dissenting) (“Moreover, adoption of the doctrine 
provides no guidance to the bench and bar as to what constitutes substantial 
compliance with personal service requirements.”). 
307. 807 N.W.2d 808, 811 (S.D. 2011). 
 308. 709 F.3d 1234, 1237–38 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-
6-4(d)(1) (2005)); accord Marshall v. Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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Dakota Supreme Court in cases involving substitute service.309 The 
court has noted, “[s]trict compliance is required for substitute 
service to reduce the inherent risk that a defendant not receive 
notice of the lawsuit.”310 Despite its introduction and frequent 
declaration, the actual notice exception has proved unworkable in 
South Dakota. 
C. Substantial Dominion: A Reasonable Alternative to an Actual Notice 
Exception 
The Minnesota Supreme Court appropriately rejected the 
actual notice exception. While the exception has proved unworkable 
in practice, it is also unnecessary. While some courts have—for good 
reason—stressed the importance of a party having its day in court,311 
Rule 4 provides a roadmap for parties to accomplish this objective. 
A plaintiff who is unable to serve a defendant personally is not 
foreclosed from effectuating service, and publication can serve as a 
combatant against evasive defendants.312  
But not all untraceable defendants have intentionally avoided 
service. Thus, a total reliance on publication is not currently 
equitable, as newspaper readership continues to plummet and the 
odds of actual notice being apprised are diminutive.313 Certainly the 
greatest remedy for deficiencies in the provision of notice by 
publication is in its expansion to include electronic forms of 
 309. See, e.g., Upell v. Dewey City. Comm’n, 880 N.W.2d 69, 75–76 (S.D. 2016); 
Carmon v. Rose, 797 N.W.2d 336, 338 (S.D. 2011); Lekanidis v. Bendetti, 613 
N.W.2d 542, 546–47 (S.D. 2000).  
 310. Carmon, 797 N.W.2d at 338 (citing Edsill v. Schultz, 643 N.W.2d 760, 763 
(S.D. 2002)). Fittingly, one justice repeatedly voiced his concern regarding the 
court’s ineffective declaration of the exception: “[A]bsent the following of service 
requirements created by our rules of civil procedure . . . I cannot join the majority 
opinion as it continues to adhere to the doctrine of substantial compliance . . . . 
[A]n advocacy of the doctrine of substantial compliance finds absolutely no support 
in our statutes concerning service of process.” White Eagle v. Fort Pierre, 606 
N.W.2d 926, 930 (S.D. 2000) (Gilbertson, J., concurring). 
 311. State v. Flotterud, 716 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Pederson v. 
Clarkson Lindley Tr., 519 N.W.2d 234, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
312. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a). 
 313. William Wagner & Joshua R. Castillo, Friending Due Process: Facebook as a Fair 
Method of Alternative Service, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 259, 273–74 (2013); Jennifer L. Case, 
Note, Extra! Read All About It: Why Notice by Newspaper Publication Fails to Meet Mullane’s 
Desire-to-Inform Standard and How Modern Technology Provides a Viable Alternative, 45 
GA. L. REV. 1095, 1097–98, 1114–1120 (2011). 
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service.314 In focusing on abode service, however, this Note proposes 
an amendment to better align Rule 4.03 with the goal of securing 
just determinations:  the expansion of abode service to include 
persons entrusted with substantial dominion over a defendant’s abode. 
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure should be interpreted 
in accordance with their plain meaning. Thus, to effectuate justice, 
this Note proposes the amendment of Rule 4.03315 read in relevant 
part: 
Service of summons within the state shall be as follows: 
(a) Upon an Individual. Upon an individual by delivering 
a copy to the defendant personally or by leaving a copy 
at the individual’s usual place of abode with a person 
of suitable age and discretion who is then: 
(1) residing therein; or 
(2) authorized by the defendant to exercise substantial 
dominion therein. 
The common dictionary definition of the word “dominion” is “a 
supremacy in determining and directing the actions of others” or 
“preponderant or overriding influence.”316 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “dominion” using words like control, possession, and 
sovereignty.317 The Black’s Law Dictionary meaning of the adjective 
“substantial” is “[c]onsiderable in amount or value.”318 
Under a plain meaning interpretation, an individual entrusted 
with “substantial dominion” over an abode must have a considerable 
amount of control or influence over the defendant’s property at the 
time of service. The abode and age requirements would remain as 
qualifiers under the proposed rule. The class of people considered 
to exercise substantial dominion could include caretakers, nannies, 
babysitters, home health aides, house sitters, family members staying 
for extended periods, and persons employed by a resident to spend 
a substantial amount of time at their abode.  
However, this list is not exhaustive. Accordingly, the 
amendment would allow for flexibility in unique circumstances to 
minimize mere technical deficiencies. Factors to consider in 
 314. See Fling, supra note 84, at 212–16; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 313, at 
279; Case, supra note 313, at 1120–25. 
315. Cf. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a).  
 316. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1931, 672 (Merriam-
Webster, Inc., ed. 1993). 
317. Dominion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014). 
318. Substantial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014). 
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establishing substantial dominion could include: the regularity and 
quantity of time the person spends at the property; the person’s 
ability to freely access the property; the duration of the person’s 
relationship with the intended recipient; and the person’s level of 
responsibility and resulting duty to those residing therein. 
Additionally, a defendant’s extended absence or incapacity might 
infer that a third party is acting with substantial dominion. Examples 
of persons excluded from the substantial dominion category might 
include landlords,319 doormen, and cleaning persons, as well as 
other classes of people who spend a minimal amount of time at an 
abode. Thus, compliance with the substantial dominion provision 
would comport with due process.320    
One potential issue under the proposed amendment concerns 
the ability of process servers to effectively provide service. In other 
words, how would a process server determine if a third party 
qualified under the substantial dominion provision? Servers would 
likely face instances in which such a determination would be difficult 
to make. However, a proclamation of the considerable factors by the 
supreme court or its advisory committee, as well as the development 
of substantial dominion doctrine via common law, would provide a 
framework for relevant inquiries at the time of service.321 Thus, 
substantial dominion would furnish a far more workable solution 
than the actual notice exception for those serving process. Under 
the latter, a process server would be tasked with assessing whether 
service would “substantially comply” with the rules of service. 
Furthermore, uncertainty regarding whether notice will ever be 
received is inherent in the actual notice exception. This uncertainty 
would be eliminated by the proposed substantial dominion provision 
because actual notice would no longer be required. 
Finally, a review of decisions employing the actual notice 
exception reveals the potential utility of the substantial dominion 
provision. Courts have applied the actual notice exception to 
 319. Though typically holding title to a property, landlords’ possessory rights 
are limited in a fashion that would fittingly deprive them of accepting service under 
the substantial dominion provision. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.
§ 1.2 (2007) (“A landlord-tenant relationship exists only if the landlord transfers the
right to possession of the leased property.”). 
320. See supra Part II.B. 
 321. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
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circumvent plain meaning when faced with possible injustice or 
absurdity—often where mere technicality would otherwise deprive a 
party of a case on the merits.322 The proposed provision would have 
rendered service effective in many of these cases, alleviating the 
court’s need to read-in an exception not provided in the rules. For 
example, in Wagner v. Truesdell, the court effectuated abode service 
on the caretaker of a mentally incompetent defendant.323 The court 
noted that a strict reading of the service requirements would lead to 
“an absurdity.”324 Substantial dominion would have provided a 
legitimate means for finding service effective, likely preventing the 
actual notice exception’s fruitless introduction into South Dakota.  
Additionally, the substantial dominion provision would account 
for many of the reasons compelling courts to apply a nexus test in 
cases of actual notice. In O’Sell v. Peterson, service was effective on a 
non-custodial stepson during his regular, planned visit to the 
defendant’s residence.325 The court cited the need for a nexus 
between the recipient and defendant that would “establish[] some 
reasonable assurance” of actual notice.326 The court considered 
factors like a relationship of confidence, the duration and frequency 
of an individual’s presence, and intent to return to the property.327 
Suitably, these factors are enveloped in the underpinnings of 
substantial dominion, which is similarly grounded in a fair assurance 
of notice. The substantial dominion approach would compensate for 
 322. See Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1967) (“[N]o hard and 
fast rule can be fashioned to determine what is or is not a party’s ‘dwelling house or 
usual place of abode’ within the rule’s meaning; rather the practicalities of the 
particular fact situation determine whether service meets the [rule’s] 
requirements.”); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 323 (D. 
Minn. 1980) (explaining that if the method of service employed by a plaintiff is 
“reasonably calculated to provide actual notice” to defendant, it should be upheld); 
O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that 
evidence of service of process actually reaching the intended person strongly 
supported a conclusion the substitute service was valid, because due process was 
afforded); Plushner v. Mills, 429 A.2d 444, 446 (R.I. 1981) (holding that the “person 
of suitable age and discretion residing therein” rule properly allowed service to the 
defendant’s daughter at the defendant’s household); Wagner v. Truesdell, 574 
N.W.2d 627, 630 (S.D. 1998) (affirming the validity of abode service on the 
caretaker of a mentally incompetent defendant). 
323. 574 N.W.2d 627, 630. 
324. Id. 
325. O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 872–73. 
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the inflexible residency standard that has left courts failing to 
provide parties with a consistent interpretation.328 In any event, the 
substantial dominion provision would alleviate many of the issues 
compelling courts to sporadically employ the actual notice 
exception. 
J.C. Jaeger, though apparently failing to forward notice, was 
entrusted with substantial dominion over his father’s property. He 
could access the property at his pleasure, and was the lone caretaker 
in his father’s extended absence.329 Had the district court found 
actual notice, it likely would have resorted to an unworkable 
exception in order to find service effective.330 Under the proposed 
substantial dominion provision, however, courts would be less 
inclined to bend the rules to effectuate justice. While providing a fix 
to only one rule out of many, the proposed provision could 
demonstrate the benefits of procedural reform of existing service 
methods.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Jaeger decision dispensed with any uncertainties regarding 
whether parties must strictly comply with requirements for substitute 
service under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03(a). Given that 
the judicial branch is charged with governing rules of procedure in 
Minnesota,331 it is unlikely that Jaeger will be negated by amendment. 
Notably, the court’s express rejection of the actual notice exception 
came in dicta,332 and is technically nonbinding. Still, the unanimous 
decision suggests the court will not depart from the Jaeger ruling in 
future decisions. 333 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court 
is not likely to overturn Jaeger on constitutional grounds, because 
states are free to exceed the constitutional floor prescribed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.334  
A plain meaning interpretation is critical to maintaining 
uniform, workable guidelines for service of process in Minnesota. 
328. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
329. See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
330. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Minn. 2016) 
(noting that Jaeger did not receive actual notice). 
331. MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017); see supra Part II.A.2. 
332. Jaeger, 884 N.W.2d at 608. 
333. See id. At 611. 
334. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982); Bloom v. American Exp. 
Co., 222 Minn. 249, 257, 23 N.W.2d 570, 575 (1946). 
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Moreover, mandating strict compliance gives parties fair notice of 
procedural requirements. Rather than accepting shortcomings 
under the current rules, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
should consider taking a more active approach in exercising its rule 
making authority. Expanding substitute service recipients to include 
persons entrusted with substantial dominion would facilitate just 
outcomes on the merits, and would provide a more workable 
solution than an actual notice exception. 
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